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ABSTRACT: In a series of recent essays, Robert Rowland has outlined the characteristics of the liberal 
public sphere. The dual purposes of the liberal public sphere are to provide appropriate 
representation to all stakeholders and to in some sense make wise choices about public policy. The 
present study tests the applicability of the liberal public sphere via a consideration of the debt ceiling 
debate that dominated American politics in the summer of 2011.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In The Audacity of Hope, then Senator Barack Obama defined American democracy 
“as a conversation to be had” and added that the “framework and . . . rules” provided 
by the Constitution and other foundational statements could not “guarantee a just 
society.” Rather, the most important function of the Constitution was to “organize 
the way by which we argue about our future,” creating “a conversation . . . in which 
all citizens are required to engage in a process of testing their ideas against an 
external reality, persuading others of their point of view, and building shifting 
alliances of consent” (2006, p. 92). Senator Obama recognized that the true genius of 
Madison’s design of the American republic was not in the system of checks and 
balances, but in the idea expressed in Federalist No. 10 that through the give and 
take of debate in the public square that there could be “a republican remedy for the 
diseases most incident to republican government” (Madison, 1999, p. 167). That 
“republican remedy” depended on the proper functioning of the liberal public 
sphere.  
 Within argumentation studies, the dominant approach to the public sphere 
developed out of the work of Jϋrgen Habermas (1989), and has been extended by 
Calhoun (1992, 1993), Asen (2009), Goodnight (1982, 1992), and others. This 
research tradition focuses on access to argument, often discussing multiple publics, 
creating a “‘multiple public sphere’” (Asen, 2009, p. 193, p. 195). Such an approach is 
especially valuable when considering how groups that have faced discrimination 
find a way to use rhetoric to state grievances. In other instances, however, the 
atomized approach is inappropriate, because it is the action of the whole that is at 
issue. The debate about the Obama health care plan is a good example of such a case 
(Rowland, 2012). In such instances, a research tradition focused on the liberal 
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public sphere (Rowland, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2012) provides the most appropriate 
means of both describing a given controversy and judging whether the public 
sphere functioned effectively. The liberal public sphere is the modern equivalent of 
the public square and includes all of the debate about a topic in political institutions, 
the media, the internet, and other contexts.  
 
2. THE LIBERAL PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
Writing of the American “constitutional system,” Thomas Mann and Norman 
Ornstein argue that the very purpose of what I label the liberal public sphere is to 
provide a means of “reconciling diverse interests and beliefs” through “adversarial 
debates and difficult negotiations” (2012, xi). Since the 2010 midterm election, the 
most important test of the capacity of the liberal public sphere to achieve that 
reconciliation and enact sensible public policy came in the 2011 debate about the 
debt ceiling, an issue so important that Bob Woodward called it “a political atomic 
bomb” (2012, p. 87). 
 There are four sets of actors in the liberal public sphere: the public, the 
representatives of the public, the media and the expert community. Each plays a 
crucial role in the functioning of the public sphere. The ultimate decision makers are 
the representatives of the public, including the president, Congress, the judiciary, as 
well as state and local elected officials, the administrative bureaucracy, and on some 
topics private actors in corporations or foundations whose actions influence policy. 
Madison recognized that “Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm” and 
that “public measures are rarely investigated with that spirit of moderation which is 
essential to a just estimate of the tendency to advance or obstruct the public good” 
(1999, p. 63, p. 194). These problems could be solved, he believed, only through 
authentic public debate in which advocates of all perspectives strongly presented 
their views. In the liberal public sphere, “Ambition must be made to counteract 
ambition” (Madison, 1999, p. 295). Thus, the function of the representatives of the 
public is to make sure that all reasonable views on a given topic are presented and 
that those views are authentic, based in the best available evidence, rather than 
mere ideological posturing. If such authentic debate occurred, he believed that good 
governance would result because “A bad cause seldom fails to betray itself” (1999, p. 
230).  
 The role of the public is to pay attention to the debate, gather adequate 
information to make an informed evaluation of it, and then through public opinion 
influence the representatives of the public. Madison believed that “Public opinion 
sets bounds to every government,” but that because of the dangers posed by the 
“passions” that “it is the reason of the public alone that ought to control and regulate 
the government” (1999, p. 290, p. 500). The role of the expert community is to 
provide the best available information on the topic to both the public and the 
representatives of the public. Unlike contemporary scholars such as Goodnight 
(1982) and Fisher (1984) who fear expert domination in the public sphere, Madison 
focused on the need for expertise, writing that “a competent legislator” needs “a 
certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which he is to legislate.” Madison 
cited as an example the need for knowledge about foreign trade in order to draft 
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legislation regulating it (1999, p. 306, p. 307). Obviously, the need for specialized 
knowledge and therefore active participation by experts has increased since 
Madison’s time. The fourth actor in the public sphere, the media, play the crucial 
role of reporting on issues, thereby creating “‘a genuine commerce of ideas’’” 
(Sheehan, 2009, p. 103). Thus, it is crucial that the media both report the best 
available information and also that they do not base this reporting in ideology. 
The liberal public sphere serves two closely related functions. First, if all 
actors perform their duties, whatever action taken should represent a legitimate 
government decision about which every stakeholder had a chance to state a case. 
Second, Madison was concerned about more than process. He also believed that a 
properly functioning liberal public sphere would choose sensible policies. In his 
view the “process of deliberation” inherent in the liberal public sphere “could 
produce results different from, and superior to” (Kloppenberg, 2011, p. 157) other 
forms of decision making, leading to the creation of “one paramount Empire of 
reason, benevolence and brotherly affection” (Madison, 1999, p. 500).  
 The foregoing analysis indicates that the functionality of the public sphere in 
any given case can be evaluated by considering five questions:  
 
(1)  Were the views of all of the relevant stakeholders represented in the 
debate? 
(2) Was the debate shaped by informed expert opinion?  
(3)  Did the media report the dispute in a way that informed the public 
and the representatives of the public on the issue?  
(4)  Did the public as a whole gather adequate information to assess the 
debate?  
(5)  Did the better arguments in some sense win out in the end? In some 
instances, there may be no principled way to make this judgment, but 
in other cases there may be a wide consensus about the action that is 
needed. In such a case, a failure to act can only be seen as a failure of 
the liberal public sphere. 
 
3. THE DEBT CEILING DEBATE IN 2011 
 
Despite the fact that the debt ceiling had been raised “78 times since 1960” and that 
previously there had never been any chance of actual default (Harwood, 2011, A11; 
Mann & Ornstein, 2012, pp. 5-7), in 2011 the United States came perilously close to 
failing to raise the debt ceiling. This nearly occurred despite the fact that there was 
complete agreement , among the president, as well as Democratic and Republican 
leaders in Congress, that default would be in the words of House Majority Leader, 
Republican Eric Cantor, “’a cataclysmic event’” that could cause “the economy to go 
under” (Woodward, 2012, p. 188, p. 220). Moreover, there was a general expert 
consensus evident in “what a succession of bipartisan groups had proposed” around 
a debt reduction plan “including restraints on domestic and defense discretionary 
spending; cutbacks in the growth of Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security; tax 
reform to reduce rates and broaden the tax base; and enough revenues to make up 
the difference” (Mann & Ornstein, 2012, pp. 15-16). Given the history of routinely 
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extending the debt ceiling, the fact that extending the debt ceiling did not in fact 
increase spending, but only accounted for spending already agreed to by Congress, 
the expert consensus on the best path to a long-term deficit deal, and the universal 
agreement on the catastrophic results of default, one might have expected a bi-
partisan deal to be easily reached. Instead, a final deal would not be reached until 
the nation went to the very brink of default.  
While much of the negotiation over a deal occurred in private, all parties 
used public statements and speeches to try to influence public opinion. Moreover, 
the details of negotiation have been reported by Scheiber (2011), Woodward 
(2012), and Mann & Ornstein (2012), and day to day developments were 
extensively covered in the media.  
The negotiations developed in three stages. In the first stage, both House 
Republicans and the President laid out plans for dealing with the deficit. The second 
stage consisted of private negotiations between a White House team lead by Vice 
President Joe Biden and Republican legislators led by Majority Leader Eric Cantor. 
This in turn led to a long period of negotiation directly between Obama and House 
Speaker John Boehner. In the final stage, the president tried to influence public 
opinion in favor of what he called a “balanced” approach to deficit reduction.  
The first stage was dominated by the competing budget proposals. The 
Republican plan, The Path to Prosperity, was authored by Representative Paul Ryan 
(2011). The Ryan plan was designed to save $4 trillion by dramatically cutting 
discretionary spending and entitlements, while also substantially cutting taxes in a 
way that primarily helped the wealthy (Hulse, 2011, A1). Noam Scheiber describes it 
as “right-wing lunacy” (2011, p. 260). In response, President Obama called for a plan 
that included “roughly $3 in spending cuts for every $1 in tax increases” an 
approach that some of Obama’s aides believed “was too reasonable” (Scheiber, 
2011, p. 269). Obama then made a major budget speech at George Washington 
University, in which he strongly defended his plan and attacked the Ryan plan 
(2011, April 13). Obama critiqued the Ryan plan for leading “to a fundamentally 
different America than the one we’ve known certainly in my lifetime,” arguing that it 
would produce major cuts in support for clean energy, education, transportation, 
and education. He also laid out the effect that the Ryan plan would have on 
entitlements and claimed that it reflected “a vision of our future that is deeply 
pessimistic.”  
Obama’s critique was “stark, but accurate” (Cohn, 2011, April 13). Ryan, 
however, reacted angrily to the speech. During it, he sat “fuming in the front row” 
and later told an Obama advisor, “’You just poisoned the well’” (Calmes, 2012, A1). 
Given that the Ryan budget document attacked the current administration based on 
the premise that “American is drawing perilously close to a tipping point that has 
the potential to curtail free enterprise, transform its government, and weaken its 
national identity in ways that may not be reversible” (2011, April 5, 26), it seems 
clear that Obama’s critique was not beyond the bounds of normal political rhetoric. 
But to Obama, Ryan’s response indicated the danger of a disastrous breakdown in 
negotiations. The normal means to force concessions from an ideological opponent 
is to wage a campaign to create public pressure for compromise. But given Ryan’s 
reaction, the administration recognized that such a public campaign might backfire. 
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Scheiber quotes the view of an unnamed Obama aide that “publicly attacking the 
Republican would blow up the negotiations” (2011, p. 271). 
The second stage consisted largely of private negotiations between the White 
House and Republican leadership in the House. In the initial negotiations between 
Biden and Cantor, it rapidly became clear that Republican negotiators were 
unwilling to agree to any increased revenue. In this situation, Democrats refused to 
agree to cuts that they otherwise might have supported because they did not feel 
that the negotiation was authentic (Woodward, 2012, p. 142). Since one side was 
refusing any compromise, while demanding major concessions from the other, it is 
hard to disagree with Scheiber’s comment that the Republican negotiating tactic 
involved “threatening the country with financial collapse unless they got their way 
on the budget” (2011, p. 268).  
 Beginning in the second and continuing into the third stage, President Obama 
and Speaker Boehner negotiated directly over a potential plan. By all accounts the 
negotiations almost succeeded in producing a so-called “grand bargain” built around 
cuts in discretionary spending, reform of entitlements, and increased revenue from 
tax reform. Ultimately, the deal foundered because “Boehner was simply incapable 
of bringing his party with him on any deal involving taxes, however minuscule the 
amount” (Scheiber, 2011, p. 278). Woodward (2012) argued forcefully that Obama 
mishandled the negotiations, but regardless of White House missteps, the inability 
of Boehner to agree to significant increased revenues because he feared “a firestorm 
of criticism from his own colleagues” (Mann & Ornstein, 2012, p. 21), made 
achieving a “grand bargain” impossible.  
 After the negotiations between Boehner and Obama had broken down, the 
president took “his case public” (Scheiber, 2011, p. 288). A typical example of his 
approach can be found in his address at the end of the negotiations (2011, July 25). 
In the speech, the president explained that “our growing debt could cost us jobs and 
do serious damage to the economy.” He made it clear “neither party is blameless for 
the decisions that led to this problem” and then argued for a “balanced approach” 
that would “cut domestic spending to the lowest level it’s been since Dwight 
Eisenhower was president,” as well as “ask the wealthiest Americans and biggest 
corporations to give up some of their breaks in the tax code.” He distinguished his 
approach from a “cuts-only approach” that “because nothing is asked of those at the 
top of the income scale . . . would close the deficit only with more severe cuts to 
programs we all care about.” In the remainder of the speech, he defended his 
approach in more detail, laid out negative effects of greater cuts, pointed out that 
previously “raising the debt ceiling was routine,” and argued that that something 
similar to the balanced approach had been followed by Presidents Clinton, Reagan 
and George H.W. Bush. He also laid out the effects of default, which he argued could 
only be produced by a “dysfunctional government.” The speech strongly supported 
the president’s position, but it was also substantive and included appeals for 
compromise.  
In a duelling statement, (2011, July 25), Speaker Boehner characterized 
Obama’s administration as supporting a “spending binge” producing “a national 
debt that has gotten so out of hand it has sparked a crisis without precedent in my 
lifetime or yours,” a comment that ignored the fact that the crisis would immediately 
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disappear if Congress merely raised the debt ceiling. Boehner then characterized the 
president’s “‘balanced approach’” as “we spend more” and “you pay more,” and 
added that Obama was “adamant that we cannot make fundamental changes to our 
entitlement programs,” statements that simply ignored Obama’s offer of 3 dollars in 
cuts for every dollar of revenue. Boehner’s comments simply did not address the 
underlying issues in the dispute.  
Obama’s advocacy campaign had a stronger impact on public opinion than 
did that of Boehner and others. The Pew Research Center (2011, June 7; 2011, 
November 17) found that 62 percent favored “a balanced approach to deficit 
reduction,” including “tax increase.” Pew found that a mere 17 percent favored a 
deficit plan focusing “mostly on program reductions.” A CNN poll (Page and 
Schouten, 2011, A1) found that “nearly two-thirds of those surveyed said 
congressional Republicans had not acted responsibly in the debt negotiations, while 
a majority credited Obama with acting responsibly.” 
 At the conclusion of the negotiation, after the White House had been forced 
to agree to a plan that didn’t include any revenue, but only cuts in spending, a plan 
that “skewed heavily toward Republican priorities” (Scheiber, 2011, p. 280), there 
was still no certainty that the Republicans in the House would accept even such a 
one-sided deal. It had become clear that “Republicans were willing to breach the 
debt ceiling, a prospect that terrified the White House” (Scheiber, 2011, p. 275). 
Woodward described the situation as “staring into the abyss with no idea what the 
outcome might be” and added that “It felt more and more like the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, only this time, the bombs were going to go off” (2012, p. 349, p. 350). 
Ultimately, the bombs did not go off, but it was a very near thing.  
 
4. CONCLUSION  
 
The 2011 debate about the debt ceiling reveals serious dysfunction at the heart of 
the American liberal public sphere. In relation to both process and policy, there 
were major problems. Only one of the four primary actors in the public sphere 
fulfilled their societal role. The expert community provided basic economic 
information about the budget deficit, the origin of the debt ceiling, likely 
consequences of major cuts or default, and so on. Most experts in academia, major 
think tanks, and in study commissions coalesced around proposals to cut the long-
term deficit, by reforming entitlements and defense, and raising revenue, while 
avoiding short-term cuts that could push the nation back into recession. While the 
expert community largely fulfilled its role in the liberal public sphere, their views 
were either ignored or denigrated by House Republicans. For many in this group, 
the very idea of expertise is tied to ideology (Mann & Ornstein, 2012, p. 187). It is 
common for postmodern critics to warn of risks of deference to expertise. The debt 
ceiling debate demonstrates that just as unthinking deference to expertise can 
disempower citizens, so unthinking ideological rejection of expertise can lead to 
policy dysfunction.  
The other actors in the liberal public sphere failed to fulfil their proper 
societal functions. When President Obama laid out a strong case for a balanced 
approach to deficit reduction, conservatives took quite personally the criticism of 
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their positions. It quickly became clear to Obama that vigorous public debate about 
alternative approaches to deficit reduction risked disaster. For a time, this forced 
the debate into private negotiation. In those negotiations, one side refused the very 
idea of compromise and threatened to push the nation into default, unless the final 
deal included only cuts and no additional revenue. In this situation, the “voices of 
caution and prudence were drowned out by the take-no-prisoners crowd” (Mann & 
Ornstein, 2012, p. 27). Both the public and the media also failed to fulfil their proper 
roles. The public was woefully unaware of basic facts of government budget policy 
(Pew Research Center, 2010, January 28). They strongly favoured cuts, as long as 
those cuts did not impact them (Pew Research Center, 2011, April 12). The 
combination of lack of knowledge and total unwillingness to sacrifice meant that 
there was no significant public pressure to push Republican leaders to engage in 
genuine discussion with the president. The media reported on the debate, but their 
focus, as always, was on the horse-race, the give and take of politics, rather than the 
underlying economic issues. Moreover, the mainstream media steers by the lodestar 
of “balance.” However, in a debate where one side rejects the expert consensus and 
will brook no compromise, a journalism based in balance is itself unbalanced, “a 
distortion of reality” (Mann & Ornstein, 2012, p. 194).  
The debt ceiling outcome was a policy debacle. The nation very nearly 
defaulted. The plan to cut the deficit that was enacted rejected the expert consensus 
that major cuts at the beginning of economic recovery following a serious downturn 
were a terrible idea and that the long-term deficit problem should be dealt with by a 
plan including significant increased revenue as well as efforts to reign in rising 
health care and defense costs and reform entitlements. Other than outright default, 
it is difficult to imagine a less sensible policy outcome. The ultimate irony was that 
while the deal was designed to respond to what conservatives saw as an impeding 
debt crisis, the immediate reaction of the markets made it clear that the deal 
worsened the problem. Shortly after the agreement, Standard & Poor’s downgraded 
government debt, resulting in a more than 600 point drop in the Dow. On the same 
day, however, interest rates on government bonds fell, making it clear that 
“investors craved the safety and security of U.S. debt” (Scheiber, 2011, p. 281). 
Investors saw that there was no immediate debt crisis. What terrified them was the 
failure of the liberal public sphere to come to a sensible agreement, when there was 
overwhelming expert consensus about the proper action. In the debt ceiling debate 
of 2011, American democracy itself failed.  
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